A new cyber-espionage campaign has emerged targeting financial institutions worldwide, leveraging a sophisticated malware family dubbed GodRAT. Based on the well-known Gh0st RAT codebase, GodRAT demonstrates how legacy malware frameworks are being repurposed and enhanced by advanced threat actors.
Severity Level: High
Threat Details
- Initial Access
- Attackers distribute malicious screen saver (.scr) and Program Information File (.pif) executables disguised as financial data.
- Delivery vector: Skype messenger file transfers.
- Files use steganography to embed shellcode in image files, bypassing traditional security tools.
- Execution and Loading
- Malicious loaders inject shellcode into legitimate processes (e.g., Valve.exe).
- Shellcode connects to attacker C2 servers, fetching and executing GodRAT DLL payloads.
- Persistence is achieved via registry run keys
(HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\MyStartupApp).
- GodRAT Capabilities
- System reconnaissance: collects OS, hostname, AV presence, and user account info.
- Process injection: executes inside curl.exe or cmd.exe with the “-Puppet” marker.
- Command & Control (C2): encrypted and obfuscated traffic with unique packet headers.
- Plugin support: notably the FileManager plugin, which enables,
- File exfiltration, creation, deletion, modification, and searches.
- Execution of arbitrary commands.
- Deployment of additional payloads.
- Secondary Implants
- Password Stealers: Target Chrome and Edge to extract saved credentials.
- AsyncRAT: Injected via reflective loaders with AMSI/ETW bypasses for stealthy persistence.
- Attribution
- Strong links to Winnti APT via:
- Similarities with AwesomePuppet RAT (2023).
- Use of “-Puppet” command line parameter.
- Shared code artifacts with Gh0st RAT.
- Indicates an evolution of legacy implants repurposed for modern campaigns.
- Strong links to Winnti APT via:
- Affected Regions: Hong Kong, UAE, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia
- Affected Sectors: Financial Institutions (Brokerage firms, Trading companies, Banks handling corporate customer transactions)
Recommendations
- Disable or tightly monitor Skype file transfers within corporate environments, especially .scr and .pif file types.
- Block execution of .scr, .pif, .com, .bat files across endpoints via Group Policy or EDR rules.
- Harden execution policies with application whitelisting (only allow signed, approved binaries).
- Enforce detection of DLL sideloading patterns (e.g., Valve.exe + SDL2.dll).
- Create EDR rules to trigger on processes created with command-line argument “-Puppet” (GodRAT marker).
- Monitor for execution of binaries from unusual directories:
- %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\google\chrome.exe (fake Chrome stealer)
- %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\google\msedge.exe (fake Edge stealer)
- Monitor and alert on suspicious run key creation:
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\MyStartupApp - Disable saving of credentials in Chrome and Edge within corporate environments.
- Encourage use of enterprise password managers with MFA enforcement.
- Block the IOCs at their respective controls
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/collection/45bede802e3ba31b061c8b1a85f7a397a82e2c2ef0daf240dbbc1b1e3a664bf8/iocs
Source:
- https://securelist.com/godrat/117119/
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