SCKit Worm Installs Rogue ScreenConnect Clients Across288 Managed Endpoints

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Attackers used ConnectWise ScreenConnect, a remote support tool run by many IT service providers,
to push malware to at least 288 computers across 48 organisations in 90 minutes on 11 November
2026. The malware, named SCKit, installs hidden remote access that survives a simple clean-up and is
built to spread to the support staff who connect to an infected machine. If you or your IT provider use
ScreenConnect, disable the five third-party RMM+ extensions named by ConnectWise and check your
environment now

1. Campaign Timeline

Huntress first saw the activity at about 17:47 UTC on 11 November 2026, across several cloud-hosted ScreenConnect
environments. About one third of the 288 hosts were hit in the first 10 minutes. The current ScreenConnect versions,
26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783, are affected. ConnectWise published an advisory at 22:45 UTC and disabled five third
party extensions in about 400 hosted partner environments. Its 12 November update reports no flaw in ScreenConnect
itself and no compromise of ConnectWise infrastructure; the initial access method and full scope remain under
investigation. Huntress responded to similar worm-like rogue client activity in September 2026.

2. Attack Chain

  • Initial Access RMM+ EXTENSION (ASSESSED): Huntress says the activity seems related to RMM+, a third-party ScreenConnect extension. Versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accept a blank access key when the administrator never set one, which bypasses ScreenConnect accounts, roles, and MFA. Commands reached endpoints with no matching login activity.
  • Execution RUN COMMAND AS SYSTEM: The operator uses the panel’s Run command feature to send commands to many endpoints at once. The first command checks for an existing ScreenConnect client.
  • Rogue Client Install: curl.exe downloads an attacker-controlled ScreenConnect installer to C:\Windows\TEMP\sc.msi and msiexec installs it silently.
  • Toolkit Delivery: PowerShell writes a base64 dropper to C:\Windows\Temp\sckit-run.bat, which downloads sckit-decoder.ps1 from ns.mo7sen[.]dev. The server returns an SCKit bundle encrypted with keys tied to that machine’s UUID.
  • Persistence RELAY TRAP: install.ps1 sets up C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap and the TrapWatch scheduled task, then a second attacker client is installed. The legitimate ScreenConnect service is stopped and set to manual start.
  • Defence Evasion: The installer adds Microsoft Defender exclusions and hides the attacker client from the installed-programs list. The full sequence takes about 50 seconds per host.

3. Malware and Capabilities

SCKit is a package of 16 PowerShell scripts, batch files, and configuration files. Huntress has not observed the
technician-spread functions below succeed; the console takeover attempt failed in every host log checked so far.

  • Relay trap TrapWatch.ps1 runs as SYSTEM every 10 seconds, compiles RelayTrap.cs into a host-specific RelayTrap.exe, and takes the legitimate client’s connection slot on the relay so the machine still looks normal in the panel.
  • Lockout policies install.ps1 adds SRP and AppLocker rules that block files pushed through ScreenConnect’s temp folders from running, and a RelayTrapLiteAlert Run key that logs ScreenConnect file-run events and new client services.
  • Spread to technician workstations (designed) When a technician connects to an infected endpoint, the kit sends Run-Lateral-Full.bat back over the session 2.5 seconds later with the action set to Run. Huntress notes this matches CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9), fixed in September 2026; the link is unconfirmed.
  • Session cookie theft (designed) Panel-Lateral.ps1 and LabConfig.ps1 use sqlite3.exe to read browser cookie databases, steal the .aspxauth session cookie, and replay it against the panel to list every session the technician can reach.
  • Shared Toolbox broadcast (designed) ToolboxRelayUploader.exe uploads WithUninstall.ps1 to the panel’s Shared Toolbox and one request runs it as SYSTEM on every reachable session. It deletes the toolbox item about 60 seconds later.
  • Reinfection Isolation alone does not remove the persistence. Huntress observed affected systems reinfecting shortly after isolation was lifted.

4. Adversary Toolkit

TOOL / INDICATORTYPEFUNCTION
Run-Lateral-Full.batBatchDropper: downloads the decoder from EadF.php?p=4 and runs it hidden in full mode.
Stage0Loader.ps1PowerShellFetches a machine-keyed payload, decrypts it to %TEMP%, runs it hidden, then deletes it.
Panel-Lateral.ps1PowerShellMain worm script: steals the technician’s ScreenConnect cookie and pushes an upload to reachable sessions.
LabConfig.ps1PowerShellHelper library: decrypts cookies, probes ScreenConnect panels, and builds rogue client installer URLs.
TrapWatch.ps1PowerShellRuns as SYSTEM every 10 seconds; stops legitimate clients and takes over the connection slot.
RelayTrap.cs / RelayTrap.exeC# (.NET)Trap binary compiled per host from the machine’s own ScreenConnect client libraries.
ToolboxRelayUploader.exe32-bit .NETConnects as the technician with a stolen token and uploads the payload to the Shared Toolbox.
sqlite3.exeLegitimate utilityReads browser cookie databases; its presence alone is not evidence of compromise.

5. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • https://www.virustotal.com/gui/collection/e79b082918050943864d44128dbe136a96bcd64098a8d6519c
    dbeb1b8a742762/iocs

6. Recommendations

  • Disable the Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, and RMM+ Password Link extensions now, on-premises servers first. Do not re-enable or reinstall them until ConnectWise gives further guidance.
  • Audit ScreenConnect Run Command and Toolbox history for mass runs you did not start, and check endpoints for a second ScreenConnect client, client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 or ed630cc2c873b091, or the participant name Addmin.
  • Do not open ScreenConnect sessions to suspect hosts. Use EDR live response or WinRM, isolate the host, then remove the rogue client service, the TrapWatch task, C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap, %TEMP%\sckit-*, and the RelayTrapLiteAlert Run value before lifting isolation.
  • From a clean device, end all active ScreenConnect web sessions, rotate ScreenConnect credentials, enforceMFA, and revoke browser and identity-provider sessions for any technician who connected to an affected host.
  • Block the IOCs at their respective controls, https://www.virustotal.com/gui/collection/e79b08291805 0943864d44128dbe136a96bcd64098a8d6519cdbeb1b8a742762/iocs

7. Sources

  • https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect
  • https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories

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