Interlock ransomware is a financially motivated group active since September 2024, targeting organizations in North America and Europe, including critical infrastructure. It uses a double extortion model, exfiltrating and encrypting data, then directing victims to a .onion site without upfront ransom demands. The group mainly targets virtual machines and cloud-based environments, uses advanced social engineering, PowerShell-based persistence, and supports cross-platform encryption on Windows, Linux, and FreeBSD.
Severity Level: High
Threat Details
- Threat Actor: Financially motivated, opportunistic group
- Targeted Sectors: Healthcare, Education, Manufacturing, Government, Public Sector, BFSI, Technology, Construction, Hospitality and Tourism
- Regions Impacted: North America, Europe
- Confirmed Campaigns (to date): around 56 claimed ransomware incidents
- Delay between attack and claim: ~ 41 days
- Peak Activity: March – July 2025
- Initial access via:
- Drive-by downloads from compromised legitimate sites
- Fake browser or security software updates
- “ClickFix” technique tricking users into pasting malicious PowerShell via fake CAPTCHA
- Ransom Note: !README!.txt, delivered via GPO, directs victim to .onion site (no upfront demand)
- Encryption Details: 64-bit executables, .interlock/.1nt3rlock extensions, AES + RSA encryption
- Latest Notable Victims: DaVita, Kettering Health, Anderson & Karrenberg, etc.
Malware & Tooling
| COMPONENT | EXAMPLES |
| RATs & Payloads | Aisa.exe, Autostart.exe, conhost.dll, cleanup.dll (SystemBC) |
| Credential Tools | cht.exe, klg.dll, Lumma Stealer, Berserk Stealer |
| Remote Tools | AnyDesk.exe, putty.exe, ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe |
| Exfil Tools | StorageExplorer.exe, WinSCP-6.3.5-Setup.exe |
| Other | Fake security software like SophosendpointAgent.exe, FortiClient.exe used in decoy delivery |
MITRE ATT&CK
| Tactic | Technique | ID | Details |
| Initial Access | Drive-By Compromise | T1189 | Compromised websites and fake software/security updates (e.g., FortiClient.exe, GlobalProtect.exe). |
| Execution | User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste | T1204.004 | ClickFix CAPTCHA trick uses clipboard-pasted PowerShell execution. |
| Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell | T1059.001 | Drops files, modifies registry, and executes recon commands via PowerShell. | |
| Persistence | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | T1547.001 | RAT placed in Startup folder and registry key “Chrome Updater” for persistence. |
| Privilege Escalation | Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts | T1078.002 | Domain admin accounts compromised to elevate privileges. |
| Defense Evasion | Defense Evasion (General) | TA0005 | Linux: removeme function deletes encryptor binary. |
| Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | T1036.005 | Files disguised as conhost.exe, conhost.txt, and fake “Chrome Updater”. | |
| System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 | T1218.011 | use rundll32.exe to proxy execution of a malicious DLL binary tmp41.wasd | |
| Indicator Removal: File Deletion | T1070.004 | tmp41.wasd deletes encryption binary to evade detection. | |
| Credential Access | Credential Access (General) | TA0006 | cht.exe, Lumma Stealer, and Berserk Stealer harvest credentials. |
| Credentials from Password Stores: Web Browsers | T1555.003 | Stealers grab browser login data and URLs. | |
| Input Capture | T1056 | Info stealers like Lumma capture user input. | |
| Keylogging | T1056.001 | klg.dll logs keystrokes in a file named conhost.txt | |
| Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting | T1558.003 | Used to escalate and compromise domain admin accounts. | |
| Discovery | System Owner/User Discovery | T1033 | WindowsIdentity.GetCurrent() to identify current user. |
| System Information Discovery | T1082 | systeminfo, Get-PSDrive gather OS and hardware details. | |
| System Service Discovery | T1007 | tasklist /svc, Get-Service enumerate services. | |
| System Network Configuration Discovery | T1016 | arp -a reveals network endpoints. | |
| Lateral Movement | Valid Accounts | T1078 | Stolen credentials used for lateral movement. |
| Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol | T1021.001 | Used to access other systems with valid creds. | |
| Collection | Data from Cloud Storage | T1530 | Uses StorageExplorer.exe to navigate Azure Storage. |
| Command and Control | Command and Control (General) | TA0011 | C2 via Cobalt Strike, SystemBC, and RATs. |
| Ingress Tool Transfer | T1105 | Payload delivery (e.g., cht.exe, klg.dll, RATs) via fake updates. | |
| Remote Access Software | T1219 | AnyDesk and PuTTY used for control and movement. | |
| Exfiltration | Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | T1567.002 | Data uploaded using AzCopy to Azure blob. |
| Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | T1048 | WinSCP used for exfiltration via non-standard protocols. | |
| Impact | Data Encrypted for Impact | T1486 | AES+RSA encryption on Windows, Linux, and FreeBSD systems. |
| Financial Theft | T1657 | Actors use a double-extortion model, both encrypting victim data and threatening release of victim data on their Tor network leak site if the ransom is not paid. |
Recommendations
- Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date; prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems.
- Enforce MFA for all users, especially for VPN, RDP, and cloud services.
- Train users to avoid clicking CAPTCHA-like prompts that instruct them to open Windows + R and paste clipboard data.
- Use external sender banners and disable links in emails where possible.
- Restrict RDP and SSH Access. Identify unauthorized use of tools like AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, PuTTY.
- Disable unnecessary scripting and command-line execution tools.
- Maintain offline, encrypted, immutable backups. Test and validate restore procedures regularly.
- Block the IOCs at their respective controls https://www.virustotal.com/gui/collection/b0e70c0df4c835605642a407bd4d9565a74d7a800d934e5aeef7c42826fbaca2/iocs
Source:
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa25-203a
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